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When’s the Party (or Coalition)?  
Agenda-Setting in a Highly Fragmented, 
Decentralized Legislature 
Mónica Pachón and Gregg B. Johnson 
Abstract: This paper examines committee behavior in Colombia to 
determine whether parties or coalitions exert agenda-setting powers 
despite the fact that the formal rules seemingly create little incentive for 
cooperation. Colombia’s party system is extremely fragmented, electoral 
volatility is high, and there is a long history of candidate-centered elec-
toral rules, all of which suggests that party and coalition leaders have few 
tools to control the legislative agenda. Additionally, chairs do not directly 
control committee reports as in other presidential cases. However, the 
naming of ponentes (rapporteurs) to write ponencias (bill reports) for the 
committee may give leaders the opportunity to set the agendas in com-
mittees. Hence, we test whether committee chairs strategically name 
ponentes to control the agenda and favor their partisan or coalition inter-
ests. We test these ideas using a unique dataset covering two complete 
legislative sessions and thousands of bills. Overall, we find that commit-
tee chairs use the ponente process to set the agenda and privilege legisla-
tion sponsored by allies, especially the executive.  
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Introduction 
Colombia has a long list of political problems, including a long-running 
civil war, economic volatility, and drug violence. Many observers have 
blamed Colombia’s problems on its weak party system, which historically 
makes it difficult to address national issues (Archer and Shugart 1997; 
Crisp and Ingall 2002; Pachón 2002). The collapse of the traditional two-
party system in the 1990s, the extreme proliferation of parties in a new 
multiparty system, electoral reforms, and the election of a president 
without a party all seem likely to exacerbate the system’s inability to “get 
stuff done” (Shugart, Fajardo, and Moreno 2006; Botero 2007; Posada-
Carbó 2011). In short, Colombian parties lack the coherence and stability 
needed to effectively make policy (Eichorst and Polga-Hecimovich 
2015). 
The present paper argues that researchers should not ask if parties 
or coalitions matter in fragmented, decentralized systems like Colombia, 
but should ask when parties and coalitions affect policy-making, and how 
different rules may affect the delegation process within party and coali-
tion ranks. Hundreds of bills are sent to committees every year. Given 
the workload, busy legislatures have developed rules to effectively allo-
cate time in order to increase the legislature’s chances of becoming rele-
vant and represent the public interest (Cox and McCubbins 2011; opi 
and Katz 2014). As a result, committee chairs in some cases, and com-
mittee majorities in other cases, must decide how to prioritize certain 
bills over others. This iterated game provides opportunities for parties 
and coalition leaders to use their powers to influence the legislative 
agenda.  
This paper augments traditional analysis of Latin American legisla-
tures by examining the policymaking process in Colombia’s legislative 
committees, rather than on the floor of the legislature. Similar to the 
cases of Perú and Costa Rica, committees in Colombia constitute the 
first stage of bill approval and can prevent bills from ever getting to the 
floor (Alcántara, Garcia, and Sánchez 2005). This contrasts with the 
situation of most legislatures in the region, in which committees only 
advise the floor with positive or negative reports (or can send multiple 
reports if there is no clear majority).1  
We argue that by examining the role of committees as agenda set-
ters we can determine the circumstances in which parties and coalitions 
actively promote or inhibit bill passage, by looking at committee chairs 
                                                 
1  In the most extreme cases, the executive branch can even bypass the commit-
tee system completely (Pereira and Mueller 2004). 
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and their decisions to delegate bill reports to different committee mem-
bers. Unlike other cases, in which committee chairs are directly responsi-
ble for the bill report to the floor majority, committee chairs in Colom-
bia can delegate the bill report to any member of the committee, regard-
less of that member’s party/coalition affiliation. Given this rule and the 
characteristics of the party system, we argue that bill characteristics and 
the type of committee play a strong role in determining when parties and 
coalitions work to set the agenda as the traditional literature on legisla-
tures posits (Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2002, 
2005, 2011). In the same way, these characteristics also determine when 
parties and coalitions – and committee chairs as their delegates – allow 
their members to act as political free agents (Krehbiel 1993, 1998). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we exam-
ine the role of parties as agenda setters. Drawing on the extant literature, 
we outline the supposed weaknesses of agenda-setting power in Latin 
American parties in general, and Colombian parties in particular. We also 
explore the factors that may counteract these supposed weaknesses and 
hypothesize that these factors will influence leaders’ agenda-setting pow-
ers within Colombia’s legislative committees. We focus specifically on 
the naming of ponentes (bill presenters) and the writing of ponencias (bill 
reports) in shaping the legislative agenda. Second, we outline the unique 
dataset we have compiled, along with the variables and statistical tools 
we have used to analyze the assignment of ponentes and the writing of 
ponencias. The third section discusses the statistical results and their impli-
cations for the agenda-setting power of parties and coalitions in the Co-
lombian legislature. The final section reiterates our main contribution to 
the Latin American literature on parties and coalitions, and discusses 
possible avenues for future research. 
The Agenda-Setting Role of Committees 
Parties-in-government are seen as procedural coalitions in which mem-
bers delegate authority to party leaders in order to set the legislative 
agenda (Aldrich 1995).2 In turn, leaders use their control over the legisla-
tive calendar and the internal rules of the legislature to determine which 
policies receive the legislature’s most precious commodity – time (Al-
                                                 
2  In this section we assume the logic of parties as procedural coalitions also 
applies to coalitions that include multiply parties, where the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of the party or coalition influences the capacity of leaders to con-
trol the agenda (Krehbiel 1993, 1998). 
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drich and Rhode 1997, 2000, 2001; Finocchiaro and Rhode 2008). Lead-
ers can use their power to actively promote legislation that improves the 
party’s reputation, or to block legislation that threatens the party’s repu-
tation (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005, 2011; Kloha 2006; Young and 
Hetshusen 2003). The former is referred to as positive agenda control, 
while the latter is termed negative agenda control, or gatekeeping. For 
example, Chile’s Concertacion majority coalition shaped important policy 
outcomes, using its power to set the legislative agenda (Londregan 2000, 
2002). Similarly, presidents can use their agenda-setting powers to influ-
ence key policy outcomes (Pereira and Mueller 2004; Alemán 2006; 
Tsebelis and Alemán 2005). Thus, parties and coalitions help determine 
what legislation becomes law. 
While much of the literature on agenda setting has examined actions 
on the floor of the legislature, scholars are increasingly examining the 
role of committees in advancing or blocking legislation. Some recent 
examples are Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) and Calvo and Chasquetti 
(2016), who demonstrated that the loss of majority control in Argentine 
and Uruguayan committees moves legislative outcomes away from the 
majority’s median preferences. Similarly, Jones and Hwang (2005) 
showed that the majority party is never “rolled” in Argentina’s powerful 
Budget Committee. However, research into the role of committees in 
agenda setting in Latin American committees is still in its infancy. 
We believe that a major reason why the agenda-setting role of 
committees has been under-studied in Latin America is the prevailing 
wisdom regarding political parties and party systems. In the heavily re-
searched US Congress, scholars have focused on intra- and inter-party 
ideological homogeneity/heterogeneity (Krehbeil 1993, 1998) because 
problems such as a highly fragmented party system and extreme electoral 
volatility simply do not exist. As noted above, these models work fairly 
well in Argentina or other settings in which the plenary has the final say, 
or where the polarized party system mirrors aspects of the US system 
(Saiegh 2009). However, parties in other parts of Latin America often 
demonstrate extreme ideological heterogeneity, with members’ ideologies 
overlapping considerably with those of other parties’ members 
(Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2008; Saiegh 2009). Similarly, party systems 
often suffer from high levels of fragmentation (Pereira and Mejia-Acosta 
2010; Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005) and extreme 
volatility (Alcántara 2012; Roberts and Wibbels 1999). This wicked com-
bination undermines incentives to build strong party reputations, since 
parties are ideologically indistinct and may cease to exist in the next one 
or two elections. Consequently, parties in many Latin American systems 
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seemingly fail to meet the conditions necessary to be used to control the 
legislative agenda. 
Perhaps no country better epitomizes this combination than Co-
lombia. Colombia’s history of candidate-centered electoral rules has 
undermined attempts to build parties focused on national goals, leading 
instead to ideologically heterogeneous parties and legislators prioritizing 
distributive pork-barrel projects (Archer and Shugart 1997; Crisp and 
Ingall 2002; Pachón 2002; Pachón and Shugart 2010; Saiegh 2009). Addi-
tionally, despite recent reforms, the party system remains fragmented, 
with an effective number of parties above 7 in both legislative chambers 
(Pachón and Hoskin 2011; Albarracín and Milanese 2012). Finally, Co-
lombia’s recent electoral volatility averaged 51.3 percent in legislative 
elections and 31.6 percent in presidential elections (Alcántara 2012). In 
such a system, the long-term benefits of building a party’s reputation by 
delegating authority to party leaders in committees seem doubtful. 
Nevertheless, recent research has shown that battles for member-
ship and leadership positions on committees in Latin America are quite 
intense (Crisp et al. 2004; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 
2005).3 This is also true in Colombia, where members seeking seats on 
coveted “power committees”4 must win elections held on the floor of 
the chamber on the first day of the legislative term, while each commit-
tee holds annual elections to select a Presidente de la Mesa Directiva, or 
committee chair (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2007).5 Both processes 
require significant coordination within parties and coalitions to balance 
out legislator’s individual and collective interests (Pachón 2002). Party 
leaders seek the best deals to guarantee the entrance of their legislators 
into the committee leadership and to ensure that their share of commit-
tee power is commensurate with their party’s seat share. Although parties 
                                                 
3  At first glance, the internal rules of the chamber seem to offer little solace for 
advocates of party or coalition-centered politics. No formal party leadership 
positions exist, while chamber and committee leadership positions last only one 
year (Pachón 2002). 
4  The First and Third Committees issue 51 percent of ponencias, or bill reports, 
while we would expect the committee average to be only about 28 percent if 
the work were distributed equally across the committees (see Appendix Table 
A2). 
5  Committee chairs are called “presidents”, as is the speaker of the chamber and 
the leader of the Senate, but the terms committee president (Presidente de la Mesa 
Directiva), chamber president, and Senate president are awkward and lend them-
selves to confusion with the head of the executive branch. Consequently, we 
use the term chair to refer to the head of the committee. Chairs serve one-year 
terms and cannot be reelected.  
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were extremely fragmented during the period under scrutiny, the role of 
President Alvaro Uribe and the resulting division of the legislature into 
pro-Uribe and anti-Uribe factions facilitated this coordination. As a re-
sult, the pro-government coalition was consistently overrepresented on 
the powerful First and Third Committees (see Appendix Table A1), thus 
providing prima facie evidence of coalition effects. Hence, battles for 
committee membership and leadership roles empower even weak party 
structures and their leaders, which in turn enhance the prospects for 
agenda setting in committees. 
While battles for committee membership and leadership are key, 
three additional committee characteristics also encourage agenda setting 
in committee. First, Colombian committees have strong purview, mean-
ing that the speaker cannot simply send a bill to a “friendly” committee 
controlled by a co-partisan (Finocchiaro and Johnson 2010). Further-
more, Colombia’s rules do not allow for discharge petitions (Pachón 
2002). Thus, while most other legislatures and parliaments around the 
world reserve the right to discharge legislation from committees, in Co-
lombia the decision of the committee is final.6 This combination of pur-
view and gatekeeping has resulted in a large percentage of bills dying at 
the committee stage, with 27 percent of executive bills and 51 percent of 
legislator-initiated bills failing to make it through their committees (see 
Table 1).7  
The third characteristic is perhaps the most important. After the 
speaker sends a bill to the appropriate committee, the committee chair 
assigns the bill to one or more ponentes, who act as the bill rapporteur(s). 
Committee chairs have complete discretion when assigning ponentes to 
write ponencias, or bill reports (Botero and Renno 2007; Pachón 2002). 
The chair may select only co-partisans, only coalition members, only 
members of the opposition, or any combination of these. Given that 
ponentes usually include one individual, or just a small subset of commit-
tee members, the chair has the power to over-represent allies and under-
represent opponents, thereby controlling the agenda and helping shape 
the policy outcome (Londregan 2000, 2002; Pachón 2002).  
                                                 
6  Although there is a clause allowing the existence of an ad hoc committee to 
help the plenary decide whether to allow a rejected bill into another committee 
for its debate, this has not happened. Instead, authors of rejected bills usually 
introduce a new version of the bill, taking into consideration the issues raised in 
the first debate. 
7  While the internal rules of the legislature are endogenous, the rules for commit-
tee membership are hard to change and have only changed marginally since 
1992 (Ungar et al. 2008). 
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Table 1. Bill Death in Colombian Committees 
Type of bill Ob-
serva-
tions 
First 
publica-
tion (per-
cent) 
First 
report 
published 
(percent) 
First report 
approved in 
committee 
(percent) 
Bill death 
rate (per-
cent) 
Executive 
bills 
     
Joint 
commit-
tees 
153 100 97 95 5 
Regular 
process 
without 
treaties 
521 98 81 73 27 
Legislative 
bills 6,003 98 63 49 51 
 
Studies of the European Parliament (Kaeding 2015) and Brazil (Maderei-
ros 2015) clearly demonstrate that rapporteurs/ponentes play a key role in 
determining policy outcomes since they draft the very reports that most 
legislators will use to inform their vote in committee. Furthermore, rap-
porteurs/ponentes have the first opportunity to propose amendments, 
which affects political negotiations. Hence, the naming of ponentes gives 
committee chairs the opportunity to influence policy-making. 
Why might ponentes set the agenda in Colombia? First, ponentes are 
charged with writing a ponencia, or bill report, and each report suggests 
whether the committee should accept or reject the bill. Second, ponentes 
control the bill amendment process. There is an informal tradition that 
committee members do not vote on the original bill, but rather on the 
bill as amended by the ponente or ponentes. Third, if the bill reaches the 
conference committee stage, then ponentes are guaranteed representation 
when the two chambers attempt to hammer out differences in the legis-
lation passed by each chamber (Alemán and Pachón 2008). Finally, ponen-
tes can influence the timing of the debate and are present in most in-
stances of negotiation. In extreme cases, ponentes simply fail to write a bill 
report and the committee never votes or reports the bill to the floor, 
even though ponentes are officially required to write a bill report (Alcánta-
ra, Garcia, and Sánchez 2005). In sum, a ponente has the power to act as a 
bill’s champion, or as its gatekeeper, meaning committee leaders may use 
them to influence the agenda. 
Why would legislators care about ponente assignments? The most 
obvious answer is that being assigned to serve as a ponente gives legisla-
tors leverage to shape executive and legislative proposals. Ponentes can 
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add amendments that benefit key constituencies or protect constituents 
from harm. For example, Senator Ballesteros served as a ponente on a 
healthcare reform bill and received campaign contributions from a pri-
vate healthcare provider (El Tiempo 2013). Similarly, ponentes can use their 
power to shape legislation in order to engage in both position-taking and 
credit-claiming (Mayhew 1974). Finally, legislators can use their ponente 
assignments to develop a reputation as a policy expert, or as a reformer. 
For example, Representative Juan Carlos Rivera Peña served as the ponen-
te on a key tax reform bill and used his position to burnish his credentials 
as a defender of middle-class interests (La Tarde 2014).  
For key legislation, ponentes should be especially careful to take the 
party’s position into account, as well as the committee chair’s perspec-
tive. Ponentes who routinely flout co-partisan or coalition committee 
chairs may lose ponente assignments in the future, be passed over for 
committee leadership positions, and be barred from “power commit-
tees” in future legislative sessions. In short, ponentes have the power to 
promote or retard the passage of legislation, legislators have incentives to 
use this power to enhance their careers, and chairs can exploit these 
incentives to set the agenda in committees. 
Given the party system and electoral rules and the internal rules 
governing the legislature, we argue that the scope of the legislation influ-
ences the value of setting the agenda through the naming of ponentes and 
the writing of ponencias. Bills introduced by the executive branch tend to 
be relatively high-profile, which means that committee chairs have 
stronger incentives to assign a friendly ponente to these bills, and coalition 
party ponentes have strong incentives to write positive ponencias (see Finoc-
chiaro and Johnson 2010). For example, President Uribe’s government 
introduced a bill in February of 2005 to disarm and “reincorporate” 
members of the right-wing AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), 
despite evidence that some members of the group had engaged in wide-
spread human rights violations. The committee chair named a group of 
overwhelmingly pro-government ponentes and the bill earned a positive 
(and quick) ponencia. The bill went on to receive final congressional ap-
proval in June of the same year. Given the nature of executive legislation, 
the Uribe coalition, and the desire to control the agenda, we hypothesize 
that: 
 
H1a: Committee chairs are more likely to name co-partisan 
and coalition ponentes to executive-initiated bills than to leg-
islator-initiated bills. 
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H1b: Coalition ponentes are more likely to write positive po-
nencias for executive-initiated bills than for legislator-initi-
ated bills. 
 
While the executive seems to dominate the legislative process, legislators 
initiated the vast majority of the legislation introduced during Uribe’s 
two terms (authors’ calculations). Furthermore, our most basic under-
standing of parties as procedural coalitions dictates that party and coali-
tion leaders will use their powers to set the agenda in ways that benefit 
their members (Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 2000, 2001; Cox and 
McCubbins 2005; Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008). For example, Senator 
Fernando Eustacio Tamayo Tamayo of the Conservative Party intro-
duced Bill 332/08 on 22 April 2008 and the bill was sent to the Third 
Committee. The senator sat on said committee and the committee’s 
chair at the time was also a member of the Conservative Party. The chair 
appointed Senator Tamayo Tamayo to serve as the initial ponente. Not 
surprisingly, the senator issued a positive ponencia. Ultimately, the bill not 
only survived in committee, but went on to survive the entire legislative 
process and become law on 3 March 2009. Given the literature’s expec-
tations regarding parties and coalitions, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2a: Committee chairs are more likely to name co-partisan 
and coalition ponentes to co-partisan or coalition-initiated 
bills than to opposition-initiated bills. 
H2b: Coalition ponentes are more likely to write positive po-
nencias for coalition-initiated bills than for opposition-
initiated bills. 
 
The scope of the legislation includes not only the initiator, but also the 
content of the bill. As such, the content may also influence committee 
chairs’ incentives to strategically name ponentes in order to set the agenda 
(Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2007). Not all projects are created equal 
and constitutional amendments (Proyectos de Actos Legislativos) face a high-
er bar to passage than ordinary legislation (Archer and Shugart 1997). 
Consequently, committee chairs may assign ponentes from a range of 
parties in order to secure the votes necessary for amending the Colombi-
an constitution. However, for these same reasons we are agnostic about 
whether parties and coalitions influence the likelihood of a positive ponen-
cia. We hypothesize: 
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H3: Committee chairs are less likely to name co-partisan 
and coalition ponentes to constitutional amendments than to 
regular legislation. 
 
While constitutional amendments are often grand in scope, legislators 
also introduce a considerable number of bills each legislative session that 
direct government spending on particular locals (Cárdenas, Junguito, and 
Pachón 2007; Crisp and Ingall 2002). These pork-barrel bills offer op-
portunities for legislators to strengthen their connections with the con-
stituents, or inside their electoral bailiwicks in the case of senators, and in 
some cases these bills are more likely to survive the committee process 
than more nationally oriented legislation (Finocchiaro and Johnson 
2010). Given Colombia’s electoral system, we expect that committee 
chairs will assign pork-barrel legislation to ponentes who will enhance the 
electoral prospects of co-partisan and coalition partners, while seeking to 
block any advantage their bills may offer opponents. The same logic 
holds for bill reports. Ponentes are more likely to write positive ponencias 
for co-partisan and coalition partners, while writing negative ponencias for 
members of the opposition. In short, we hypothesize that: 
 
H4a: Committee chairs are more likely to name co-partisan 
and coalition ponentes to parochial or pork-barrel legislation.  
H4b: Ponentes are more likely to write positive ponencias for 
coalition-initiated pork-barrel bills than for non-coalition-
initiated pork-barrel bills. 
 
While bill characteristics play a prominent role in our hypotheses, we 
also argue that committee type is likely to influence the naming of co-
partisan and coalition members as ponentes, as well as the type of ponencias 
these ponentes write. Just as the parties and coalitions influence the com-
position of “power committees” (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2007), 
chairs of these important committees have strong incentives to over-
represent allies and under-represent opponents, giving their co-partisans 
an advantage over important legislation, the possibility of their bill get-
ting presented by an “amicable” legislator. Similarly, these behaviors also 
suggest that coalition membership may matter given the polarization of 
the legislature into pro-Uribe and anti-Uribe camps. Furthermore, the 
importance of power committees suggests that ponentes on power com-
mittees are more likely to use negative ponencias to kill bills sponsored by 
the opposition. In short, parties and coalitions exercise agenda control 
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when the stakes are high, and the stakes are higher on power commit-
tees. Consequently, we hypothesize that: 
 
H5a: Committee chairs are more likely to name co-partisan 
and coalition ponentes when bills are assigned to power 
committees than when they are assigned to weaker com-
mittees. 
H5b: Ponentes on power committees are more likely to write 
positive ponencias when coalition members sponsor bills. 
 
In sum, our hypotheses focus on the potential effects of bill characteris-
tics and committee characteristics in the naming of ponentes and the writ-
ing of ponencias. In the following section we will outline our original da-
taset, the variables we use, and the methods used to test our hypotheses. 
Data and Methods 
This analysis uses data from the Colombian Chamber of Representatives 
and Senate during two legislative sessions. The first session began 20 July 
2002 and lasted until 20 June 2006, while the second began 20 July 2006 
and lasted until 20 June 2010. The two legislative sessions coincide with 
President Uribe’s first and second terms, and also with the change in the 
electoral system. Our data set contains all initiatives that were introduced 
in the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate for both sessions and 
was constructed using Congreso Visible (Visible Congress).8 For the first 
part of our analysis, ponente assignment, the unit of observation is a 
committee chair-ponente dyad for each bill introduced and assigned to the 
committee. Thus, a bill may appear only once or could appear multiple 
times, depending on the number of ponentes assigned by the committee 
chair. Each observation has information about (1) the party and coalition 
membership9 of the ponente, (2) the district where the ponente was elected, 
                                                 
8  Congreso Visible (<www.congresovisible.org>) is a Colombian online congres-
sional archive housed at the Universidad de los Andes that is designed to give 
Colombian citizens and scholars of Colombian politics (1) a comprehensive 
record of all members of congress and all political parties active in the legisla-
ture; (2) details of all bills initiated and all laws passed; and (3) electoral and leg-
islative reports, among other information. 
9  Pro-Uribe and endorsed parties included de la U, Cambio Radical, ALAS, 
Colombia Democrática, and the Conservatives. Pro-Uribe, but not official en-
dorsed parties included Convergencia Ciudadana, Movimiento de Integración 
Regional, and Colombia Viva. The opposition was composed of the Liberal 
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(3) a classification of the bill’s targeting, (4) the bill’s author(s) and 
his/her party and coalition affiliation, and (5) the committee to which 
the bill was sent.10 Each observation includes the party and coalition 
information of the committee chair’s party. For the second part of our 
analysis – type of ponencia – the unit of observation is the ponencia, or bill 
report, one per bill. Here, our interest was in testing whether the combi-
nation of certain characteristics – such as naming one or more ponentes 
from the same party or coalition – would result in a positive report.  
In order to test whether co-partisanship or coalition membership 
influence the assignment of ponentes by the committee chair, we created 
two simple dummy variables. The first dependent variable simply 
measures whether the ponente and the committee chair were from the 
same party. The second dependent variable measures whether the ponente 
and the committee chair were from the same coalition.11 For example, 
Tarquino Pacheco Camargo of the Cambio Radical (Radical Change) 
chaired the First Committee and his party was also a member of the 
governing coalition.12 Overall, approximately 17 percent of the bills had 
a majority of ponentes from the committee chair’s party, while roughly 
two-thirds had a majority of ponentes from the same coalition as the 
committee chair. 
We created another simply dummy variable to test whether coalition 
membership influences the type of ponencia reported to the committee. 
At this stage, our unit of analysis is the bill and we measure whether the 
report was positive (scored a “one” in this case) or negative. Nearly 85 
percent of bills had positive ponencias.13 We limit our analysis of the re-
ports to the ponencias del primer debate, or reports at the first stage of de-
                                                                                                    
Party, the POLO, and indigenous parties. Shugart (2006) did not classify a 
number of one or two-seat parties such as Nacional Progresista, Movimiento 
Nacional, Salvación Nacional, and Huila Nuevo Liberalismo. We relied on the 
parties’ websites and news accounts to determine whether these parties were 
pro-Uribe or were members of the opposition. 
10  We also include collected information on the following: (1) any actions taken 
on the bill, (2) any actions taken in the committee or on the floor, and (3) and 
the bill’s final status (law, in committee, archived, or retired). 
11  Our measure includes parties that were members of the pre-electoral coalition. 
12  In a separate analysis (not shown) we used a dependent variable for whether 
the ponente and the committee chair were from the same district. We did not 
find strong geographically oriented effects. 
13  Additional analysis (not presented) used a dependent variable that distinguished 
between ponencias that were “positive” versus ponencias that were “positive with 
modifications”, as 63 percent of the positive ponencias were issued with modifi-
cations. The model showed no substantive difference between the two types of 
ponencias and was therefore omitted. The model is available on request. 
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bate, as selection effects may play a role at subsequent stages of debate. 
Jointly, these dependent variables enable us to test whether committee 
chairs strategically assign ponentes and whether these ponentes influence the 
type of ponencias presented to the committee for debate. 
The independent variables focus on bill and committee characteris-
tics. Bill characteristics include a series of dummy variables for bill spon-
sor and type of legislation. First, we include dummy variables for wheth-
er the bill was initiated by the Uribe administration, by a member of the 
committee chair’s party, or by a member of the governing coalition. 
Recall that we expect committee chairs to guide these bills to friendly co-
partisan or coalition ponentes. Second, we measure whether the bill was a 
constitutional amendment or whether it was parochially focused. The 
former includes all proyectos de acto legislativos, while latter draws on Taylor-
Robinson and Diaz’s (1999) widely used measure of the scope of legisla-
tion to classify pork-barrel legislation. We examined whether a bill was 
focused on providing a targeted benefit to a particular municipality or 
department.14 Colombian legislators routinely introduce bills that build 
civic works or monuments, or issue a tax stamp (or bond). Both types of 
bills provide “pork” for a geographically defined area, hence our coding 
scheme.  
We follow the same conventions regarding the bill reporting stage 
in our analysis. We again include a dummy variable for whether the bill 
was initiated by the Uribe administration. However, because our unit of 
analysis is the bill report, we cannot include dummies for each combina-
tion of ponente/author. Instead we constructed a series of dummies de-
termining whether: (1) the majority of the ponentes were members of the 
coalition in a government authored bill; (2) the majority of the ponentes 
were not members of the coalition in a government authored bill; (3) the 
majority of the ponentes and the author were not members of coalition; (4) 
the majority of the ponentes were not members of the coalition, but the 
author was; and (5) the majority of the ponentes were members of the 
coalition, but the author was not. Therefore, the omitted category is 
when the majority of ponentes and the author were members of the coali-
tion since this is the most common category. Remember, we expect 
coalition ponentes will be more likely to issue positive ponencias when the 
bill was authored by coalition party members or by the government, 
whereas they will be more likely to issue negative ponencias when the bill 
is authored by legislators outside the governing coalition. Constitutional 
                                                 
14  Colombia’s provinces are called departments, which are subdivided into munic-
ipalities. 
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amendments and pork-barrel legislation are scored as noted in the previ-
ous paragraph. 
To address committee characteristics, we include a dummy variable 
for whether the committee was assigned to a power committee (the First 
or Third Committees). This variable is scored identically for both mod-
els. As noted previously, membership on these coveted committees re-
quire extra votes, and these two committees actually produce a majority 
of each chambers’ legislation. Recall we predict that both committee 
chairs and ponentes will emphasize agenda-setting powers when bills are 
sent to these committees. 
In addition to bill and committee characteristics, we include several 
control variables. The first is a dichotomous variable for whether the bill 
was being considered in the Senate. Similarly, we also include a dummy 
variable for 2002–2006 Congress. The third variable accounts for the 
number of ponentes (logged) assigned to a given bill. The more ponentes 
assigned to a bill, the less likely it is that any given ponente will be a co-
partisan or coalition partner. Finally, we include a series of dummy varia-
bles for the year in the president’s term, with the final year being the 
excluded category. Jointly, these variables address the perceived political 
polarization of Uribe’s terms. 
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variables, we use 
logistic regression with robust standard errors in both sets of models. 
Our models are structured as follows: 
 
To test whether presidents choose members of their own party or 
coalition, 
Chair-Ponentes Matchi = 0 + 1*Author_characteristicsi + 
2*Committeei + 3*Election_cyclei + 4*Legislature 2006-2010i + 
5*Pork + 6*Controls + ei  
To test whether ponentes give a positive or negative report on their 
first debate, 
Ponenciai = 0 + 1*Author-ponentes combination dummiesi + 
2*Committee_dummiesi+ 3*Election_cyclei + 4*Legislature 2006-
2010i + 5 *Pork + 6*Treaties + ei 
 
We also ran models with a number of alternative specifications and addi-
tional control variables, but we omitted these as they did not alter our 
statistical or substantive conclusions.15 
                                                 
15  The alternative models included: (1) models that dropped bills that were as-
signed ponentes, but were never reported out of committee, (2) controls for 
where a bill was in the legislative process, (3) models that used whether the 
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Results 
When, if ever, do committee chairs use party or coalition cues when 
assigning ponentes? We begin our analysis with an examination of the 
effects of bill characteristics by focusing on the author of the bill (see 
Table 2). Overall, we find that committee chairs are significantly more 
likely to assign bills authored by the executive to co-partisan and coali-
tion ponentes. Similarly, our models indicate that when the bill’s author is a 
co-partisan of the chair, the chair is more likely to send the bill to a co-
partisan ponente. The example given in the theory section, regarding a 
Conservative Party chair assigning a Conservative Party senator to serve 
as the ponente of his own bill, is emblematic of a systematic relationship 
between committee chairs and their co-partisans. The same result holds 
in the case of coalition-authored legislation. Chairs are significantly more 
likely to assign these bills ponentes from the coalition. These results pro-
vide clear evidence that committee chairs use their agenda-setting powers 
when assigning ponentes to bills that originate from “one of their own”. 
This result provides clear support for H1a and H2a. 
Turning from bill authorship to the type of bill, we find that consti-
tutional amendments and pork-barrel legislation do influence how com-
mittee chairs assign ponentes, but not as we hypothesized. The negative 
coefficient for naming co-partisan ponentes matches our predictions, but 
the relationship is not statistically significant, whereas the positive and 
significant coefficient for naming coalition ponentes directly contradicts 
expectations. However, given the high bar needed for amending the 
constitution, this result may not be surprising to some observers of Co-
lombian politics. Perhaps more surprisingly, given the literature’s heavy 
emphasis on pork barreling in Colombian politics, we find that commit-
tee chairs are systematically less likely to name co-partisan or coalition 
ponentes to legislation designed to benefit a particular geographic local. 
It may be that principles of universalism mean chairs do not assign 
pork-barrel legislation based on party or coalition cues, but allow all 
members to oversee their own pet projects. 
 
  
                                                                                                    
chair was from the same district or region as the initiator, and (4) an alternative 
measure of coalition that included parties that were not formally in the gov-
ernment coalition, but allied with the Uribe administration during the legislative 
sessions. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Ponente Assignment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Same party Same coalition Same region 
Government bill 0.3619** 0.262** -0.256 
 (0.1655) (0.134) (0.231) 
Co-partisan author 0.6858***  -0.426*** 
 (0.1153)  (0.162) 
Constitutional amendment -0.2464 0.448** -0.0855 
 (0.2645) (0.178) (0.284) 
Log ponentes/estado -0.6349*** 0.130** -0.375*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0579) (0.0902) 
First committee 0.1671 -0.817*** 0.664*** 
 (0.1659) (0.121) (0.180) 
Second committee 0.4283** 0.0156 -0.156 
 (0.2112) (0.168) (0.299) 
Third committee 0.6261*** 0.116 0.0501 
 (0.2026) (0.165) (0.246) 
Fourth committee -0.3323 -0.0758 -0.692** 
 (0.2713) (0.186) (0.330) 
Fifth committee 0.3086 -0.311* -1.349*** 
 (0.2331) (0.173) (0.444) 
Sixth committee 0.5894*** 0.0807 -0.718*** 
 (0.1712) (0.143) (0.258) 
Senado -0.0347 0.0208 -3.180*** 
 (0.1011) (0.0813) (0.229) 
Pork -0.3816** -0.265* 0.160 
 (0.1841) (0.142) (0.243) 
Session 2006 -0.3644** -0.798*** -0.336* 
 (0.1443) (0.107) (0.172) 
First year of term -0.2978 0.596*** -0.715*** 
 (0.2008) (0.157) (0.237) 
Second year of term -0.0969 0.418*** -0.0831 
 (0.1761) (0.133) (0.197) 
Third year of term 0.2972** 0.223** -0.736*** 
 (0.1227) (0.0961) (0.152) 
Coalition author/s  0.320*** -0.0254 
  (0.0844) (0.136) 
Constant -1.3757*** 0.680*** -0.540** 
 (0.1725) (0.147) (0.221) 
Observations 5,087 5,087 5,087 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Our models regarding the effects of committee type on ponente assign-
ment also provide mixed support for our hypotheses. On the one hand, 
the chairs of the Third Committee, which oversees finances, taxes, and 
subsidies, behave in a consistently partisan fashion. These chairs are far 
more likely to name a co-partisan to serve as a ponente than chairs on 
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other committees. On the other hand, the chairs of the First Committee, 
which oversees constitutional reforms, statutory laws, district organiza-
tion, and peace strategies, systematically under-represent coalition part-
ners when assigning ponentes. It may be that while both committees are 
truly power committees, the nuts and bolts of governing that member-
ship in the First Committee entails simply provides fewer incentives for 
committee chairs to behave in partisan or coalition ways – at least when 
compared to the Third Committee. 
Overall, these models provide considerable evidence that committee 
chairs use partisan and coalition cues when assigning ponentes strategically, 
and that certain bill characteristics are fundamental when making this 
decision. This is largely consistent with the view that parties and coali-
tions are procedural coalitions. As such, they help set the agenda in an 
otherwise chaotic legislative process. To further illustrate these relation-
ships, we calculated the change in predicted probability of naming a co-
partisan ponente (see Table 3), or a coalition ponente (see Table 4), given 
distinct bill, committee, and control variable characteristics.  
Table 3. Predicted Probability of Committee Chair Naming a Co-partisan 
Ponente  
  Probability of co-
partisan ponente 
95 percent confi-
dence interval 
Non-co-partisan author, non-
government bill, not Third Com-
mittee, second term, not third year 
in term 
0.0966 0.077 to 0.116 
Co-partisan author, non-
government bill, not Third Com-
mittee, second term, not third year 
in term 
0.1750 0.1387 to 0.2114 
Co-partisan author, government 
bill, not Third Committee, second 
term, not third year in term 
0.2336 0.1595 to 0.3076 
Co-partisan author, government 
bill, Third Committee, second 
term, not third year in term 
0.3630 0.242 to 0.484 
Co-partisan author, government 
bill, Third Committee, first term, 
not third year in term 
0.4507 0.3277 to 0.5736 
Co-partisan author, government 
bill, Third Committee, first term, 
third year in term 
0.5248 0.3952 to 0.6544 
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In both instances, party and coalition membership substantially increases 
the likelihood of serving as a ponente. In short, committee chairs system-
atically privilege members of their team. 
Table 4. Predicted Probability of Committee Chair Naming a Coalition 
Ponente  
  Probability of 
coalition ponente 
95 percent confi-
dence interval 
Non-coalition author, non-
government bill, First Committee, 
second term, not first year in term 
0.3602 0.3001 to 0.4204 
Coalition author, non-government 
bill, First Committee, second term, 
not first year in term 
0.4367 0.3746 to 0.4987 
Coalition author, government bill, 
First Committee, second term, not 
first year in term 
0.5019 0.4136 to 0.5902 
Coalition author, government bill, 
not First Committee, second term, 
not first year in term 
0.6953 0.6282 to 0.7623 
Coalition author, government bill, 
not First Committee, first term, 
not first year in term 
0.8352 0.7919 to 0.8784 
Coalition author, government bill, 
not First Committee, first term, 
first year in term 
0.9019 0.8631 to 0.9407 
 
Now we turn to the types of ponencias that ponentes write. Table 5 presents 
the marginal effects. The model shows the marginal effect comparing a 
positive and negative report. As expected, bills authored by the executive 
with a majority of ponentes by the coalition have the greatest positive 
marginal effect, which shows that these bills are “guarded” by the coali-
tion members. It is also interesting to observe that bills authored by 
members of the coalition and that have non-coalition ponentes have a 
negative marginal effect, which suggests the intention to look for a nega-
tive report – contrary to the idea of protecting your co-partisans or coali-
tion partners. Equally, bills authored by non-coalition members that are 
assigned coalition ponentes have a greater probability of getting a negative 
report. These results strongly support H1b and H2b and justify commit-
tee chairs’ naming coalition ponentes at the first stage in the agenda-setting 
process. In short, our analysis supports the notion that party and coali-
tion membership shape the legislative process in ways that benefit their 
allies and hurt the opposition by controlling the agenda at the committee 
stage. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the Type of Ponencia (Bill Report) (Average 
Marginal Effects) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Positive 
Gov bill, coalition ponentes 0.196*** 
 (0.0668) 
Gov bill, non-coal ponentes 0.0930* 
 (0.0541) 
Coalition bill, non-coal ponentes -0.0404* 
 (0.0232) 
Non-coal bill, non-coal ponentes -0.0123 
 (0.0220) 
Non-coal bill, coalition ponentes -0.0524* 
 (0.0282) 
First committee 0.0128 
 (0.0181) 
Third committee -0.0357 
 (0.0262) 
Pork 0.199*** 
 (0.0366) 
Number of ponentes (logged) -0.00732 
 (0.0118) 
Senate 0.0313* 
 (0.0168) 
Treaties 0.196*** 
 (0.0668) 
Constant 0.0930* 
 (0.0541) 
Observations 1,895 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
As before, we used these results to calculate the predicted probability of 
a positive ponencia across a range of values on the key independent varia-
bles (see Table 6). After determining that almost all pork-barrel projects 
and international treaties receive positive ponencias, we divided the table 
with national legislation on the left and pork/treaties on the right. The 
congruence between the bill author’s coalition and the composition of 
the ponentes plays absolutely no role for pork-barrel projects and treaties. 
Regardless of the coalition membership of author and ponente, these pro-
jects receive nearly universal support in the ponencia stage. However, we 
do find that the congruence between the bill’s author and the ponentes 
greatly affects the probability of a positive ponencia for national legisla-
tion. When legislator-initiated bills are assigned unfriendly ponentes, these 
bills are far more likely to receive a negative ponencia.  
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Table 6. Predicted Probability of a Positive Ponencia 
 National legislation (ex-
cluding treaties) 
Pork barrel projects and 
treaties 
  Probability 
of positive 
report 
Confidence 
interval 
Probability 
of positive 
report 
Confidence 
interval 
If government-
authored and ponen-
te from coalition 
0.9594 0.9193 to 0.9994 0.9989 0.9968 to 1 
If government-
authored and ponen-
te from non-
coalition member 
0.9107 0.8443 to 0.9771 0.9973 0.9931 to 1 
If coalition-
authored and ponen-
te from non-
coalition member 
0.7749 0.7306 to 0.8191 0.9922 0.9798 to 1 
If non-coalition-
authored and ponen-
te from coalition 
0.7574 0.6908 to 0.8240 0.9914 0.9776 to 1 
Other 0.8123 0.7781 to 0.8464 0.9944 0.9850 to 1 
Note:  84.97% received a positive ponencias, other variables set to their mean. 
Overall, our analysis indicates that committee leaders use their power to 
systematically favor co-partisans and coalition members when naming 
ponentes, or bill presenters. Furthermore, these ponentes are more likely to 
issue positive reports for bills written by their allies. In short, parties and 
coalitions can use the committee process to help set the agenda, despite 
Colombia’s volatile, fragmented party system and electoral rules that 
discourage party-building. 
Conclusions 
The Latin American literature laments the weakness of the region’s polit-
ical parties. Party system fragmentation, electoral volatility, and ideologi-
cal incoherence seem to exacerbate many of the region’s problems. At 
the extreme, these problems are blamed for the poor quality of democra-
cy in the region and even for democratic failure. In this paper we exam-
ine when, if ever, political leaders can overcome highly decentralized 
legislative processes and inherent weaknesses in a party system to help 
control the agenda. Our analysis focuses on Colombia, as its party sys-
tem seems to suffer from all the frailties outlined in the extant literature. 
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Drawing on an original dataset we test whether committee chairs 
are able to counterbalance some of the limitations that party leaders face 
given the current internal rules of the Colombian committee system. We 
focus on the assignment of ponentes (bill presenters) by committee chairs, 
as well ponencias (bill reports), since both offer party and coalition leaders 
the opportunity to set the agenda before legislation can reach the plena-
ry. We test when bill and committee characteristics influence these pro-
cesses, and find that committee chairs use these processes to help con-
trol the agenda. Chairs assign friendly legislation to co-partisan or coali-
tion partner ponentes, and these ponentes write positive ponencias for their 
friends. Chairs can use these same tools to block opposition legislation. 
In sum, the party begins when committee chairs strategically name ponen-
tes and continues through the reporting stage.  
Future work should aim to get at the “black box” of the amending 
process. Researchers should test whether ponentes use the process to sub-
stantially modify the original bill, or whether the amending process does 
not affect the initial intent of the authors. Further research is also need in 
order to understand (1) the role of parties and coalitions in the various 
stages of bill approval, (2) whether parties and coalitions influence nego-
tiations within conference committees, and (3) the substantive result in 
the policy-making process at the committee stage. 
Additionally, more work must be done to examine the potential 
agenda-setting powers of committees and their leaders across presiden-
tial systems. Distinct party systems and internal legislative rules offer 
wildly varied environments to test the agenda-setting powers of legisla-
tive committees. Our work simply represents an important step in a 
promising, yet understudied topic. In short, further exploration of these 
committee processes in Colombia and elsewhere allows us to determine 
whether reformers can achieve their goals of strengthening parties in 
order to facilitate policy-making.  
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¿Cuándo existe el partido (o la coalición)? El proceso de control de 
agenda en una legislatura altamente fragmentada y descentraliza-
da 
Resumen: Este artículo examina el comportamiento de las comisiones 
permanentes en Colombia para determinar si los partidos o coaliciones 
ejercitan su poder de agenda, a pesar de que las reglas formales generen 
pocos incentivos a la cooperación. El sistema de partidos colombiano ha 
sido extremadamente fragmentado, la volatilidad electoral ha sido alta, 
con una historia significativa de personalización de la política. Todo esto 
sugiere que los partidos y los líderes de coalición tienen pocas herramien-
tas para controlar la agenda legislativa. Adicionalmente, los presidentes 
de comisión no controlan directamente los informes emitidos por las 
comisiones, como lo es en otros casos presidenciales. No obstante, el 
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nombramiento de ponentes puede dar una oportunidad estratégica a los 
líderes. En este artículo, evaluamos si los presidentes de comisión esco-
gen estratégicamente los ponentes para ejercer control sobre la agenda, y 
así favorecer sus intereses partidarios o de coalición. Analizando dos 
periodos legislativos, encontramos que efectivamente los presidentes de 
comisión utilizan su poder de elegir a los ponentes como una forma de 
favorecer sus intereses de partido/coalición, privilegiando la legislación 
de origen ejecutivo, y de sus co-partidarios.  
Palabras claves: Colombia, política legislativa, comisiones legislativas, 
partidos políticos 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Membership of Committees in the House and Senate, 2002–
2010 
Senate 2002–2006 Senate 2006–2010 
Commit-
tee 
Coali-
tion 
Others Total Coali-
tion 
Others Total 
First 65% 35% 20 80% 20% 20 
Second 38% 62% 13 62% 38% 13 
Third  53% 47% 15 67% 33% 15 
Fourth 47% 53% 15 64% 36% 14 
Fifth 42% 58% 12 75% 25% 12 
Sixth 60% 40% 15 54% 46% 13 
Seventh 42% 58% 12 67% 33% 15 
 102 102 
 
House 2002–2006 House 2006–2010 
Commit-
tee 
Coali-
tion 
Others Total Coali-
tion 
Others Total 
First 54% 46% 35 69% 31% 35 
Second 47% 53% 19 47% 53% 19 
Third  55% 45% 29 62% 38% 29 
Fourth 52% 48% 27 52% 48% 27 
Fifth 53% 47% 19 63% 37% 19 
Sixth 44% 56% 18 61% 39% 18 
Seventh 42% 58% 19 63% 37% 19 
 166 166 
Source:  <www.congresovisible.org>, elaborated by authors. 
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Table A2. Percentage of Ponencias, by Committee, 1998–2010 
  Freq. Percent
First 4,86 34
Second 1,109 8
Third 2,497 17
Fourth 1,363 10
Fifth 1,043 7
Sixth 1,616 11
Seventh 1,836 13
Total 14,324 100
Source:  <www.congresovisible.org>, elaborated by the authors. 
Table A3. Permanent Committees and Jurisdiction 
Committee Number Jurisdiction
First Constitutional Reforms, Statutory Laws, District 
Organization, and Peace Strategies 
Second International Relations, National Security and 
Defense, Treaties 
Third Treasury, Taxation, Subsidies
Fourth Budget, Financial System Control, Sale of Na-
tional Assets 
Fifth Agriculture, Ecology, Environmental Issues, 
and Regional Development Agencies 
Sixth Mass Media, Communication, Public Emergen-
cies, Public Services, Transport, and Public 
Works 
Seventh Public Service, Union Organizations, Societies, 
and Social Security 
 
 
